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Public Access Channels in Cable
Television: The Economic Scarcity
Rationale of Berkshire v. Burke
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional historians and lay-persons alike would be
alarmed if the United States Goverfnment seized five pages of
the New York Times in an attempt to increase public access to
the media. This adverse reaction would stem from the traditional
conception of freedom of the press from governmental interfer-
ence.' Under the first amendment, 2 a newspaper's editorial con-
trol is virtually immune from regulation.3 Despite the sanctity
of newspapers, the other two media models 4 -broadcast and
I
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the
acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to
assure financial success; and second, the journalistic integrity of its editors
and publishers.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974) (quoting Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)).
2 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitutes the exercise
of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with first amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to
this time.
418 U.S. at 258.
4 For a description of the three media models under the first amendment free
press clause-print, broadcast and cable-see I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
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cable television-have not been afforded equally stringent first
amendment protection from compelled access.5
Although cable communications clearly are protected under
the first amendment, 6 cable access channel requirements 7 exceed
access regulations imposed on other communications media. 8
Cable access channel rules have been promulgated by federal, 9
state 0 and local" governments. As the cable industry becomes
an increasingly important communications medium,' 2 first
amendment treatment of cable regulations has become a fre-
quently litigated issue. 3
Access requirements vary in degree, ranging from the provision of a right to
reply to a personal attack (least) to a general public right of access to the publishing or
channel capacity of the media (greatest). See B. Scm.m'Dr, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V.
PUBLIC ACCESS 15-16 (1976).
6 "It is now clearly established ... that cable operators engage in conduct
protected by the First Amendment." Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434,
1444 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See-also Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United
States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3S0
(1985); Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir.
1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571
F.2d 1025, 1054 & n.70 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
First amendment protection applies equally to cable operators that do not produce
original programming, since cable activities such as retransmitting and packaging pro-
gramming are likewise protected under the first amendment. See 757 F.2d at 1337. See
also 768 F.2d at 1444; 694 F.2d at 127-28.
1 Access channel rules require cablecasters to reserve from four to seven channels
from the system's channel capacity for public use, including local government access,
local education access, public library access, and general public access. See notes 9-11,
infra.
, See B. SCmIDT, supra note 5, at 16; G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, J. MERCURIO,
CABLESPEECH: THE CASE FOR FIRST AmENDMENT PROTECTION 1-13 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as CABLESPEECH]; Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: the FCC, the
First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 133 (surveying cable
regulations other than public access regulations and comparing them to print and
broadcast regulations).
9 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §§ 611-12; 47 U.S.C.A. § 531
(West Supp. 1985).
'o E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-19-6 (1977).
Local "Requests For Proposals" (RFP's) often cite access channels as one of
several criteria upon which the competitive franchise will be awarded. See, e.g., CA-
BLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 13-14.
12 See generally 1. POOL, supra note 4, at 1-10.
1 Id. See BAEYA, Book Review , 97 HARv. L. REv. 584, 585-86 (1983) (reviewing
I. POOL, supra note 4). See also cases cited supra note 6.
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This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of government-
mandated access channels for cable television. Section one ex-
amines the Supreme Court's rejection of access laws for the
print media,' 4 while Section two reviews the Court's decisions
regarding public access to television broadcasting.' 5 Section three
surveys the regulatory treatment of the cable industry and ana-
lyzes Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 6 a recent
decision upholding public access channels for cable television.1
7
The Comment concludes that mandatory cable access channels
are not consistent with the constitutional limits placed on man-
datory access to other communications media."
I. AcCESS TO THE PRINT MEDIA AFTER Tornillo
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,'9 a ruling con-
sistent with the stringent first amendment protection of the print
media, 0 the United States Supreme Court struck down a Florida
statute that mandated access to newspapers. 2' The offending
"right-to-reply" lawn2 provided political candidates with free
newspaper space to respond to editorial criticisms of their fitness
for office.2
3
The plaintiff in the Tornillo case was a political candidate
seeking to enforce his statutory right to reply to criticisms of
him contained in a Miami Herald editorial. 24 In support of his
" See text accompanying notes 19-35 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 36-65 infra.
571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1985).
" See text accompanying notes 66-132 infra.
See text accompanying note 133 infra.
". 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
See, e.g., 418 U.S. at 254 (describing the judicial gloss that has developed on
the first amendment to prohibit governmental coercion of the press).
1, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1972).
Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for reply - If any
newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate
for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate
with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official
record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper
shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any
reply he may make thereto ....
22 Id.
21 Id.
" 418 U.S. at 243-44.
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right to government-enforced access, the plaintiff advanced a
novel "affirmative duty" theory of the first amendment.Y The
theory posits that inherent in the first amendment right of free
speech is an equally compelling right to be heard.2 6 The Tornillo
Court thoroughly reviewed and then rejected the plaintiff's af-
firmative duty rationale as a basis to support Florida's right-to-
reply statute.2 7 The Court acknowledged both the communica-
tions revolution 28 and the "trend toward concentration of control
2- The constitutionality of enforced media access has been the subject of debate
between affirmative duty (pro-access) theorists and those favoring strict constitutional
protection of the media. The affirmative duty theory posits that the right of free speech
guaranteed by the first amendment is of limited value without access to the media,
through which speech may be communicated. Therefore, the government has an "af-
firmative duty" to ensure public access to the media to safeguard first amendment
freedoms. See generally Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 478 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Lange, The Role of the Access
Doctrine in the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 1
(1973); Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TaxAs L. REv. 766 (1970).
Affirmative duty theorists assert that the concentration of the media into national
syndications has restricted general access to the media, depriving the public of its ability
to "respond or contribute in a meaningful way to the [public] debate on issues." 418
U.S. at 250. "[Supporters] of an enforceable right of access to the press vigorously
argue that government has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach
the public .... [Tlhe first amendment acts as a sword as well as a shield, it imposes
obligations on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the press from govern-
ment regulation." Id. at 247-48. Critics of compelled access argue that enforced access
laws infringe upon the constitutionally protected function of editors. See CABLESPEECH,
supra note 8, at 80-89. See generally Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the
Problem of Access Under the First Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. I001 (1981); Lange,
supra note 25; Note, Access to Cable Television: A Critique of the Affirmative Duty
Theory, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1393 (1982); Abrams, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 361 (1976).
Free press advocates view the issue as "a choice between the possibility of more
expression reaching more people, but decreed and enforced by the machinery of the
State, and the principle that, 'for better or worse, editing is what editors are for'." Id.
at 367 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 124 (1973)).
16 See generally Lange, supra note 25.
27
However much validity may be found in these arguments, at each point
the implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access
necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or consensual.
If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation
with the express provisions of the first amendment. ...
418 U.S. at 254 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 248.
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of outlets to inform the public,' '29 but refused to uphold the
right-to-reply statute based on a constitutional right of access to
the media. 0
The Court observed that a compelled right-to-reply actually
detracted from the goals of affirmative duty advocates. 31 The
Court stated that news editors, under the threat of forced,
unedited reply time, would be less willing to comment on con-
troversial issues,32 thus reducing the public debate33 that access
supporters seek to promote. The Court held that this likelihood
of a "chilling effect" on editorial comment3 4 creates an uncon-
stitutional abridgment of freedom of the press.
35
II. ACCESS TO BROADCASTING
A. Constitutional Access to Broadcasting
Comprehensive regulation of broadcasting began early in the
development of the industry with the creation of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934.36 Prior to govern-
mental regulation, radio reception suffered from crippling inter-
ference caused by too many broadcasters in a finite radio
spectrum. 37 The overcrowded airways required FCC licensing of
radio frequencies which necessarily precluded many potential
:' Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 257-58.
I d.
418 U.S. at 257.
"Governmental enforced right of access inescapably dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate." Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published
news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access stat-
ute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.
Id.
" Id. at 257-58.
" Pub. L. 98-214, 97 Stat. 1467 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
610 (1981)).
" See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 104 (1973) (See notes 52-65 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.); Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (upholding
FCC authority to adopt Chain Broadcasting Regulations). See also Report on Editorial-
izing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (report in connection with hearings
on obligations of broadcast licensees to editorialize).
1985-861
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broadcasters, clearly an impediment to the excluded broad-
casters' first amendment speech.38 Under first amendment scru-
tiny by the Supreme Court, FCC licensing and regulation were
upheld due to the unique scarcity of the broadcasting spectrum
and the necessity of government regulation to preserve the via-
bility of the broadcasting industry.3 9 The FCC also used the
spectrum scarcity rationale to support its development of a gen-
eral fairness doctrine4° for broadcasting that includes limited
public access requirements .4
Two fairness doctrine access rules require broadcasters to
provide substantive notice to any group or individual that has
been the subject of editorial criticisms, and to offer cost-free
airtime in which to reply.42 In sharp contrast to the ruling in
Tornillo, the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
F. C. C. ,41 held that the FCC right-to-reply provisions were consis-
tent with the first amendment. The Court found that the spectrum
scarcity rationale creates an affirmative duty among broadcast
licensees to present diverse viewpoints on controversial issues."' Since
See, e.g., 412 U.S. at 104.
' E.g., CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 54-65. See also cases cited supra note 37.
The FCC's statutory authority to develop fairness doctrine regulations is based
on the Communications Act of 1934 which requires broadcasters to use their allotted
frequency in the "public interest." 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976). Out of the "public interest"
standard, the FCC developed a body of regulations collectively known as the "fairness
doctrine." 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910-.1930 (1981).
This doctrine, as formulated and administered by the FCC, provides that
"(1) the broadcaster must devote a reasonable percentage of... broadcast
time to the coverage of public issues; and (2) his coverage of these issues
must be fair in the sense that it provides an opportunity for the presentation
of contrasting points of view."
CABLESPEECn, supra note 8, at 50. The fairness doctrine has come under increasing
attack in recent years, culminating in the denouncement of the doctrine by the FCC
itself. In a recent pronouncement, an FCC panel unanimously stated that "the Fairness
Doctrine no longer serves the public interest" and acts to "chill and coerce speech."
FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler has targeted the Commission's own fairness doctrine
regulations as "his No. 1 target for repeal." Stuart, Fairness Doctrine Assailed By
F.C.C., The New York Times, August 8, 1985, page 1, col. 1, and page 19, col. 2-4.
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910-.1930 (1981).
47 C.F.R. § 72.123 (1980).
13 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
" It does not violate the first amendment to treat licensees given the privilege
of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obli-
gated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern.
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a broadcast of editorial criticisms either creates or recognizes the
existence of a controversy, broadcasters may be required to air op-
posing opinions.
Using the spectrum scarcity rationale, the Red Lion Court
upheld compelled access regulation for broadcasters, 46 while the
Tornillo Court expressly rejected comparable access to the print
media.47 Red Lion's constitutional distinction for broadcasting,
based on the physical properties of the radio spectrum, '4 conceiv-
ably could justify even greater governmental interference with
broadcaster discretion such as a public right to free airtime. 49 The
Red Lion Court, however, stressed the major role"0 of the first
amendment in broadcasting, suggesting constitutional limits to com-
pelled access."1
To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present
representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with
the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the
abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
Id. at 394.
See id. at 385-86.
" The Supreme Court's ruling in Red Lion, which upheld limited public access to
broadcasting, is frequently cited in support of public access regulations of cable televi-
sion. The Red Lion Court's statement that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the'First Amendment standards applied to them" is ubiq-
uitous support for cable public access. Id. at 368. The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected recently the "new media" language in Red Lion as automatic justifica-
tion for intrusive cable regulations:
The suggestion [of the Red Lion Court] is not that traditional First Amend-
ment doctrine falls by the wayside when evaluating the protection due
novel modes of communication. For the core values of the First Amend-
ment clearly transcend the particular details of the various vehicles through
which messages are conveyed. Rather, the objective is to recognize that
those values are best served by paying close attention to the distinctive
features that differentiate the increasingly diverse mechanisms through
which a speaker may express his view.
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in
allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable
without government assistance to gain access to those frequencies for
expression of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling at issue here
are both authorized by statute and constitutional.
395 U.S. at 400.
41 See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 94-95.
395 U.S. at 389.
These limits were delineated in the Court's opinion in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94. See notes 52-56 infra and
accompanying text.
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B. The Limits to Red Lion and the Fairness Doctrine
The Supreme Court seized the opportunity to define the
constitutional limits of the fairness doctrine in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat' Comm.12 The Court
ruled on the assertion by two political groups53 of a constitu-
tional right to purchase editorial advertising time from an FCC
broadcast licensee.5 4 The petitioners' request for guaranteed air-
time exceeded the scope of the right-to-reply rules upheld in Red
Lion, which created only a conditional right of access triggered
by the broadcaster's own editorial comments.15 In contrast, the
petitioners in Columbia Broadcasting demanded an uncondi-
tional right to purchase editorial advertising time.
5 6
The Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting held that
mandatory paid access would severely restrict broadcasters'
journalistic discretion57 by allowing any group that could af-
ford to purchase airtime to control editorial content. 8 The
Court refused to emasculate broadcasters' control to that ex-
tent, instead allowing editorial discretion to remain in the
hands of broadcast editors,59 subject to the fairness doctrine
52 412 U.S. 94.
1 The two political groups demanding the right to purchase editorial advertising
spots were the Democratic National Committee and the Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace, the latter group being an organization of national businessmen opposing
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Id. at 97-98.
Id.
" See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
6 412 U.S. at 130-32.
" Id. at 117-21.
51 [T]he public interest in providing access to the marketplace of ideas and
experiences would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor
of the financially affluent, or those with access to wealth. Even under a
first-come first-served system, . . . the views of the affluent could well
prevail over those of others, since they would have it within their power
to purchase time more frequently.
Id. at 123.
59
It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the public interest in being
informed requires periodic accountability on the part of those who are
entrusted with the use of broadcast frequencies, scarce as they are. In the
delicate balance historically followed in the regulation of broadcasting
Congress and the Commission could appropriately conclude that the allo-
cation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated in the licensee rather




The Columbia Broadcasting decision defined the constitu-
tional limits on mandatory access to the broadcast media. 6' The
Court imposed these limits despite the presence of compelling
grounds for governmental interference based on the spectrum
scarcity properties of broadcasting. 62 In both Red Lion63 and
Columbia Broadcasting, the Supreme Court was faced with the
prospect of increased public expression, but a loss of private
editorial control.64 The Court narrowly tailored government-
mandated public access, holding that the first amendment gen-
erally favors private editorial control. 65
III. AccEss To CABLE TELEVISION
A. The New Cable Technology
The cable industry was established to import broadcast sig-
nals into regions too isolated to receive direct broadcast signals.
66
Early cable systems carried only a limited number of channels,
but technological developments transformed cable from a mere
distribution system into a new communications network. 67 Al-
though technology now permits a cable system to carry as many
as fifty-four channels'6 programming services available via sa-
telite far exceed the system's channel capacity.69 Therefore, ca-
blecasters must selectively choose programming packages from
the increasing variety available.
70
The growth of cable television has left the courts in a quan-
dry as to the first amendment treatment of this new medium.
See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
412 U.S. at 125.
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367.
See id. at 386; 412 U.S. at 116.
412 U.S. at 130-32.
" CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 1.
17 Id. at 5.
,1 Current technology permits 54 channels to be carried in a single coaxial cable. Some
modern systems have been designed with two cables to double their channel capacity to
108 channels.
Interview with Richard M. Garrett, Jr., Technical Director, Daniels & Associates,
Jeffersonville, Indiana (August 15, 1984).
" CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 2-4.
" Id. at 3.
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The courts have attempted to analogize the cable industry to
one of the existing media-print or broadcast.7' The spectrum
scarcity rationale, 72 adopted to justify broadcast content regu-
lation, is not applicable to cablecasting73 because cable transmis-
sions do not utilize the radio spectrum.74 The cable industry,
therefore, has operated generally as an analogue of the print
media.7
Cable remained virtually unregulated until the 1960's, when
cable operators began importing distant programming signals
into developed broadcast markets in competition with local
broadcast stations. 6 In 1962, the FCC began regulating cable
operators' activities to protect local television licensees.? In 1977,
Although cable television operators are undoubtedly engaged in some forms
of speech protected by the First Amendment, the extent of this protection
has not as yet been clearly defined. In our pursuit of answers we seek
guidance by analogizing to other areas such as newspaper and broadcast
journalism where First Amendment concerns have already been addressed
(citations omitted).
Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 950 (D.R.I. 1983).
For a further explanation of media models, see note 4 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
" See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating
certain FCC provisions regulating and limiting types of programs that cablecasters and
subscription broadcast television could offer); CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 63. But
see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981)
(discussing a city's authority to limit franchisee cable systems to within geographic
boundaries).
7 Cable programming is transmitted by coaxial conductor, which is attached to
utility poles or buried underground. Interview 'with Richard M. Garrett, Jr., supra note
68.
' See, e.g., SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE
TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 2 (1971) ("the analogy is not to conventional television, but
to the printed press"). But see Black Hills Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th
Cir. 1968) ("it is irrelevant that [cable] systems do not themselves use the airwaves").
76 For an excellent regulatory history of the cable industry, see G. WEBB, THE
ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 31-40 (1983).
" The first regulation of cable occured in the form of "must carry" rules, pursuant
to which cable operators were required to retransmit all off-air broadcast channels within
a specified proximity to the cable system. See, e.g., In re Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963). See also Rules Regarding Microwave-Served CATV First Report and Order in
Docket No. 14,895, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685, 697-716 (1965). See generally United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968). The FCC's "must carry" rules were
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the FCC imposed on cablecasters the first access channel require-
ments. 78 These access rules required cable operators in the largest
one-hundred markets both to offer a minimum of twenty chan-
nels of programming and to reserve four of these channels for
public, governmental, educational, and leased access.79
Access channels inherently violate the cablecaster's first
amendment rights by restricting editorial discretion over a sig-
nificant portion of the system's channel capacity. 0 The Colum-
bia Broadcasting Court expressly rejected similar restrictions as
unconstitutional when applied to broadcasters.8 Furthermore,
recently struck dowrn by the D.C. Circuit on first amendment grounds in Quincy Cable,
768 F.2d 1434, 1459-63. The Quincy Court ruled that the must carry rules constituted
at the very least an "incidental" burden on speech. The court held:
The [must carry] rules coerce speech; they require the operator to carry
the signals of local broadcasters regardless of their content and irrespective
of whether the operator considers them appropriate programming for the
community it serves. The difficulty is not so much that the rules force
operators to act as a mouthpiece for ideological perspectives they do not
share, although such a result is by no means implausible. The more certain
injury stems from the substantial limitations the rules work on the opera-
tor's otherwise broad discretion to select the programming it offers its
subscribers.
Id. at 1452 (citation and footnote omitted).
14 See G. WEBB, supra note 76, at 31-34. Although the FCC's statutory authority
to regulate cable was not clear, the Commission argued that its regulation of cable was
imperative lest the explosive growth in cable undermine the regulatory framework estab-
lished by the FCC for ordinary broadcast television.
If permitted to grow unfettered, the Commission feared, cable might well
supplant ordinary broadcast television. A necessary consequence of such
displacement would be to undermine the FCC's mandate to allocate the
broadcast spectrum in a mannner that best served the public interest. In
particular, if an unregulated, unlicensed cable industry were to threaten
the economic viability of broadcast television, the Commission would be
powerless to effect what it saw (and continues to see) as one of its cardinal
objectives: the development of a "system of [free] local broadcasting
stations, such that 'all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least
one television station as an outlet for local self-expression.' ".
768 F.2d at 1439 (quoting U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 87-1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962)).
7 See G. WEBB, supra note 76, at 33-34.
- See 763 F.2d at 1447-63 (holding that FCC "must carry" rules unconstitutionally
infringe upon the first amendment editorial discretion of cablecasters); CABtaSPEECH,
supra note 8, at 122. See also text accompanying notes 86-105 infra.
81 See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra. Thus, even if cable were held to be
an analogue of the broadcast media, access regulations to the extent of public access
channels would be inconsistent with the constitutional limitations placed by the United
States Supreme Court on access to broadcasting.
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regulations comparable to access channels, such as "access pages"
in the New York Times, would certainly be unconstitutional as
applied to print journals.8 2 Since cable television is a medium
equally protected by the first amendment, 83 access advocates
must constitutionally distinguish84 cable from the other com-
munications media to justify cable's disparate first amendment
treatment.
85
B. Cable Access Channels
1. The Editorial Discretion of Cablecasters
Supporters of cable access channels argue that the editorial
control of cable operators is of a lower magnitude 6 than that
exercised by broadcasters. This theory cites the program-by-
program selection of material by broadcast editors, in contrast
to the channel-by-channel programming decisions of cable op-
erators.87 This view contends that the cable media serves as a
mere conduit for the program editing of others, thereby meriting
a lesser degree of first amendment protection and permitting the
imposition of public access channels.88
The characterization of cable as a conduit simply does not
reflect the technological advancements in cablecasting.5 9 Al-
82 See note 1 supra.
" See note 6 supra.
The clear failure of the "technological scarcity" argument as applied to
cable television amounts to an invitation to reconsider the tension between
the Supreme Court's radically divergent approaches to the print and elec-
tronic media. Indeed, since the scarcity argument made little sense as a
basis for distinguishing newspapers from television even in the late 1960's
and early 1970's, such reconsideration seems long overdue.
L. TRIBE, AzERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-22, at 699 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
See also note 46 supra.
' See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 101.
See, e.g., CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 82.
See id.
See id. at 101.
' See F.C.C. v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) ("Cable operators now
share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their
programming will include."); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d at 1452
("Although in cable's infancy cable operators served exclusively as passive conduits of




though the early cable industry was primarily an exporter of
broadcast programming, today the cablecaster functions much
like a newspaper editor.9° Newspaper editors select material to
fill their newspaper's pages, choosing from news, editorial com-
ment, sports, comics and society. In doing so, newspapers avail
themselves of a range of wire service material not gathered by
their own reporters. 91 While recognizing the broad technological
developments in newspaper journalism, the Tornillo Court did
not reduce the constitutional protection of the print media on
the grounds that newspapers are increasingly conduits for the
wire services. 92 Likewise, the use of a significant amount of
network programming by network-affiliated broadcasters was
considered insignificant in the Columbia Broadcasting decision,
which rejected mandatory paid public access to broadcasting. 93
Cable operators allocate programming to fill their systems'
channel capacity, selecting from a wide variety of subjects.
9 4
Programming may originate with both the local cable system
and the national cable programming services. 95 Cable program-
mers, such as the Cable News Network and Home Box Office,
are given first amendment protection as the suppliers of a sub-
stantial portion of cable programming. Therefore, mandatory
access channels interfere with the editorial discretion of cable-
casters in two ways; first, by reducing the number of channels
over which cablecasters may exercise content control, 97 and sec-
ond, by reducing the number of channels for which cable pro-
grammers may compete. 93
The Supreme Court recognized the cable operator's editorial
discretion in F.C.C. v. Midwest Video, 99 the first case to chal-
K. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 3-4.
See id. at 85.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
'" See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973).
" See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 4, 80-81.
A See id. at 1-2.
" See Home Box Office v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 43-51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977) (invalidating the application to pay cable television of rules restricting
programs offered for a fee on a per program or per channel basis).
' See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 80-89; 768 F.2d at 1438, 1452-53.
See 567 F.2d at 49-51; 768 F.2d at 1438, 1445, 1453.
. 440 U.S. at 689, 707.
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lenge FCC access channel regulations. The Court refused to
consider the first amendment arguments raised, merely charac-
terizing them as "not frivolous,"'0 and instead struck down the
access channel regulations as beyond the FCC's statutory juris-
diction.' 0' The decision focused on limiting FCC authority to
matters "reasonably ancillary to the performance of the Com-
mission's responsibilities to regulate broadcast television."' 02 In
a side note, however, the Court indicated that access channel
rules intrude on a cable operator's editorial discretion.13 This
observation apparently refutes the conduit theory by recognizing
that channel-by-channel programming decisions do constitute an
exercise of editorial discretion.' °4 Therefore, absent other distin-
guishing characteristics in the cable medium, the editorial dis-
cretion of cablecasters should be given first amendment status
on a level comparable to the other communications media.
05
2. The New Scarcity Rationale for Cable: Berkshire v. Burke
Some states'06 have regulated cable under a "natural monop-
oly" theory, similar to that used to regulate public utilities. 0 7
Since there is typically only one cable system serving a given
locality, some states have asserted jurisdiction over cable systems
Id. at 709 n.19.
Id.
,02 Id. at 708.
[W]e reject the contention that the Commission's access rules will not
significantly compromise the editorial discretion actually exercised by cable
operators. At least in certain instances the access obligations will restrict
expansion of other cable services. And even when not occasioning the
displacement of alternative programming, compelling cable operators in-
discriminately to accept access programming will interfere with their deter-
minations regarding the total service offering to be extended to subscribers.
Id. at 707-08 n.17.
-01 See id.
301 See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at viii.
Forty states regulate the cable industry in some form, primarily with price
regulations. See G. WEBB, supra note 76, at 39. See also T.V. Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304
F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev.) (recognizing the right of states to control all aspects of domestic
cable television operation that are not preempted by federal control), aff'd, 396 U.S.
556 (1968).
'o7 CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 122.
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through the state public service commission. 0 For example, the
Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers has pro-
mulgated rules requiring cable operators to reserve seven public
access channels.0 9
Rhode Island's access rules, more expansive than those
created by the FCC, were challenged and upheld in Berkshire
Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke."0 In Berkshire, the
district court propounded a novel rationale-economic
scarcity"'-to support an enforced duty to provide public ac-
cess to the cable medium." 2 Unlike the spectrum scarcity ra-
tionale, which 'is based on the physical characteristics of the
broadcast spectrum, economic scarcity rests on the legal"' and
I' d.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-19-3 (1977).
571 F. Supp. 976, vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1985) (rendered moot by
award of cable franchise to another applicant while appeal was pending).
- Id. at 986. The economic scarcity rationale has been offered to support the
power of municipal governments to franchise cable systems within defined boundaries.
See Community Communication v. City of Boulder, Colo., 660 F.2d 1370. Cf. Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985) (holding that a municipality may not award an exclusive
cable franchise if local utility poles can accomodate more than one cable operator). A
clear distinction lies between such power to franchise use of the public ways and the
power to dictate the content of cablecasting as upheld in Berkshire.
" 571 F. Supp. at 986.
"' Due to the construction of cable systems over city streets and public easements,
cable companies are said to use the "public right of way." States and municipal
governments have asserted franchising authority over the cable industry to regulate the
potentially disruptive effect of cable construction and maintenance. The franchising
process is normally a competitive evaluation in which the franchising authority will
choose from several appplicants and award only one franchise. While franchises are
seldom labeled "exclusive," it is rarely economically feasible for a community to support
more than one cable company. Critics of public access channels often concede the
franchising authority's interest in regulating the public ways, but they criticize efforts at
content regulation based on this rationale. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 106-10.
The D.C. Circuit Court considered this contention in Quincy Cable:
The potential for disruption inherent in stringing coaxial cables above city
streets may well warrant some governmental regulation of the process of
installing and maintaining the cable system. But hardly does it follow that
such regulation could extend to controlling the nature of the programming
that is conveyed over that system. No doubt a municipality has some power
to control the placement of newspaper vending machines. But any effort
to use that power as the basis for dictating what must be placed in such
machines would surely be invalid.
768 F.2d at 1449. See also 754 F.2d at 1405-07.
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economic" 4 barriers to entry into the cable industry. These
barriers, the court reasoned, promote a scarcity comparable to
the spectrum scarcity that justifies broadcast regulation.".
3. An Analysis of the Economic Scarcity Rationale
There are several flaws in the Berkshire court's reasoning.
First, in Tornillo, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
economic scarcity theory as a basis for newspaper access."
6
Second, the Berkshire court proposes no compelling distinctions
between cable and print media to overcome this precedent.1
7
Moreover, even if the economic scarcity rationale were held to
be a justification comparable to the spectrum scarcity rationale
in the broadcast media, the Berkshire court ignored the strict
constitutional limits placed on access to the broadcast media in
Columbia Broadcasting."'
114 The Berkshire court cites the start-up costs of constructing a cable system as an
economic barrier to public access. The system proposed in Newport, Rhode Island, was
estimated to cost seven million dollars. High capital expenditures are not unique to the
cable industry since investment for all communications media is very high. The Gannett
Publishing Company's recently released USA Today was estimated to cost the publishers
$125 million in 1984 alone. Interview, Wall Street Week, Kentucky Educational Televi-
sion, Lexington, Kentucky (August 25, 1984).
"I "For this court, at least, scarcity is scarcity-its particular source, whether
'physical' or 'economic' does not matter if its effect is to remove from all but a small
group an important means of expressing ideas." 571 F. Supp. at 986-87.
11 See text accompanying notes 19-35 supra.
,, The district court incorrectly distinguishes cable from newspapers on the grounds
that cable systems are natural monopolies. Although there is typically only one cable
system serving a given household, the Tornillo Court rejected the proliferation of one-
newspaper towns as a basis for government-enforced access to the print media. Moreover,
the district court does not consider the entire market of communication and entertain-
ment alternatives wherein cable does not retain monopolistic characteristics. Whereas
telephones constitute a monopoly over spoken communication, cable television competes
with local off-air broadcast television, cinemas, and home video equipment. See CA-
BLESPEECH, supra note 8, at 122-26. The court in Quincy Cable rejected the monopoly
rationale in its ruling that federal "must carry" rules violate cablecasters' first amend-
ment rights:
Nor, on this record, can we concur in the suggestion that the "natural
monopoly characteristics" of cable create economic constraints on com-
petition comparable to the physical constraints imposed by the limited size
of the electromagnetic spectrum. At the outset, the "economic scarcity"
argument rests on the entirely unproven-and indeed doubtful-assumption
that cable operators are in a position to exact monopolistic charges.
768 F.2d at 1449-50 (citations omitted).
" 412 U.S. 94. See text accompanying notes 52-62 supra.
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The Berkshire court acknowledged that an "economic scarci-
ty" argument for newspapers was advanced and expressly re-
jected in Tornillo. The Tornillo Court stated: "IT]he same
economic factors which have caused the disappearance of vast
numbers of metropolitan newspapers, have made entry into the
marketplace of ideas served by the print media almost impossi-
ble."1 19 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Tornillo refused to
permit content regulation under an economic monopoly ration-
ale. 20 The Berkshire court, however, ruled that Tornillo did not
apply to cablecasting, simply because Tornillo dealt with the
print media.'
2'
The Berkshire court's rejection of the print media analogy
parallels the affirmative duty "right to be heard" theory.' 22 By
upholding mandatory public access channels, the district court
created a general right of access to those communications media
that are otherwise inaccessable due to economic barriers. 2  The
Berkshire court exempted the print media from access require-
ments, reasoning that everyone may "publish" in some form.
24
With this statement, the Berkshire court suggests that a lone
citizen with access to a copy machine can rival the widely-
acknowledged power of the New York Times. If the court seeks
to enforce a right to be heard over the medium of choice, this
distinction is tenuous.
,' 418 U.S. at 251.
12 Id. at 254. Antitrust laws have, however, been applied to regulate print media
monopolies. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (contract between wire
services to furnish news exclusively to each other violated antitrust laws).
121
While it is true that the Supreme Court has rejected economic scarcity as
a basis for the regulation of newspapers, the lack of any access requirement
for newspapers simply does not prevent a member of the general public
from expressing his opinions in that same medium, which in such a case
is print, of course. Any person may distribute a written message in the
form of a leaflet, pamphlet, or other relatively inexpensive form of "pub-
lication." In contrast, a resident of Newport County who does not have
seven million dollars to develop his own cable system is shut out of that
medium with no way to express his ideas with the widely acknowledged
power of the small screen.
571 F. Supp. at 986 (emphasis in original).
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.




Even if economic scarcity could justify access to cable com-
munications, the court does not come to terms with the consti-
tutional restrictions on forced access to broadcasting.'12 The
Supreme Court, by narrowly defining public access to broad-
casting, has sought to balance broadcasters' constitutionally pro-
tected editorial discretion with the public interest in receiving
fair coverage of controversial issues.' 26 Although the Supreme
Court has ruled that the public interest is substantial enough to
support fair editorial coverage2 7 and equitable commentary about
political candidates, 28 the Court has stopped short of permitting
unconditional public access through paid editorial advertise-
ments.' 2
9
The Berkshire court, however, did not confront these limits.
The court instead characterized Rhode Island's access channels
as "less intrusive" than the fairness doctrine because "they
require only that all individuals be given an opportunity to air
their views on a first-come, first-served basis."' 30 The fairness
doctrine, in contrast, creates a conditional right of access trig-
gered only by the airing of controversial issues.' 3' Cable access
channels are more logically comparable to the "right to adver-
tise" denied by the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting,
since both access channels and advertising rights significantly
reduce editorial control by providing unconditional access to the
forum. 132
CONCLUSION
The Berkshire court's "constitutional distinction," based on
economic scarcity, does not justify public access channels in the
cable industry. The court's new scarcity theory begins with the
I" Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94.
See text accompanying notes 52-65, supra.
See, e.g., 412 U.S. at 796.
," Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC
licensing criteria).
' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 397, 400 (1969).
412 U.S. at 796.
11 571 F. Supp. at 988.
"' See text accompanying note 56 supra.
,, See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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premise that all persons have a right to access to all forms of
expression-a concept foreign to the current interpretation of
the first amendment. The United States Supreme Court's refusal
to recognize an affirmative duty interpretation of the first
amendment is based on an aversion to expansive governmental
infringement upon the private media's editorial discretion.
Despite the Court's refusal to acknowledge a right of public
access to the press, state and local governments continue to base
highly intrusive regulations of the cable industry on minor tech-
nological distinctions between cable, broadcasting and publish-
ing. Likewise, the Berkshire court has upheld public access rules
in the constitutionally protected cable medium. The distinctions
offered to support the Berkshire court's opinion, however, do
not justify the result. Economic scarcity is present in all media
insofar as the communications industry is highly capital-inten-
sive. To support government-enforced access on this basis threat-
ens the historical interpretation of the first amendment. The
Supreme Court, meanwhile, has preferred to promote an endur-
ing first amendment, unaffected by technological advancements
in the electronic media, by encouraging the "marketplace of
ideas" to remain a free market.'33
Laurel L.F. Garrett
"I The "marketplace" metaphor was first used by Justice Holmes: "[T]he best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market. . . .That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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